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 Abstract
 
This paper addresses ways of modelling Punjabi
conflict resolution strategies. The model produced
will be used to develop simulation software of con-
flict resolution procedures in Punjab, Pakistan.
Anthropologists in Pakistan and South Asia have
long sought ways of dealing with the seeming con-
tradictions of collective explanations of behaviour
and the impact of individual behaviour [see espe-
cially Ahmed 1980; Barth 1959; Leach 1954; for a
more recent and less regionally specific discussion
of the problem see Aunger 1995]. Part of the expla-
nation of this dilemma lay in the presence of com-
peting social structures from which individuals
decide on courses of action. The individual in South
Asia is constrained by the collective in many
respects, yet the collective has at its disposal com-
peting sets of social rules or structures from which
the individual may draw strategies and values. Thus
it is not a contradiction to say that there is little room
for individual action in Pakistan and to simultane-
ously to recognise that individual action is a deter-
mining factor for social phenomenon. Individuals
are able to manipulate parallel and even contradic-
tory sets of values and strategies which allow them
to conform to collective expectations. The sketch of
a model design in this paper presents some of the
reasons why it is desirable to render social context
or environment more complex, as well as offering
some broad description of how one would begin to
do so.
 
1. Modelling social phenomena
 
Most social modelling has been concerned with aggregated
agents. A more recent focus has been constructing intelli-
gent disaggregated agents who can not only interact in real-
istic ways but also evolve in realistic ways. The context or
environment has not tended to receive nearly as much
focus as the agent. Radical multi-agent modellers would, of
course, disprove this generalisation. For radical multi-
agent modellers every aspect of the model is represented as
an agent. As far as modelling human social systems, how-
ever, the radical multi-agent modellers have not yet had a
significant impact, perhaps for good reason. It is not by any
means, always desirable to construct each variable in a
model as a complex agent, in any case it is difficult.
 
1.0.1.   Bargaining model
 
Thoyer et al. [2001] developed a bargaining model to sim-
ulate negotiations between water users in France. Their
goal was to create tools to guide the negotiation process in
the wake of the French water law of 1992, which requires
collective and local negotiation of water regulations. Water
regulations must be negotiated in each river sub-basin. The
model employs aggregate ‘players’, seven negotiation var-
iables and an estimate of farmers’ utility functions based on
hydraulic and economic models.
There are problematic assumptions in this model if we
seek to apply it even partially to the task of studying Punjabi
conflict negotiations: 
 
1. perfect information distributed across all participants
2. each ‘round’ outcome determined by the sum of the 
player’s utilities derived from each player’s proposals 
in the next round weighted by the access probability
3. a lack of alternative arenas in which to conduct negoti-
ations
 
First, Thoyer et al. acknowledge that perfect distribution
of information is not characteristic of real life situations but
introduce this assumption for the purposes of their model. It
is sometimes necessary to introduce model assumptions
that are clearly not viable, particularly when one is first
investigating basic properties. To the extent that the model
so hobbled can account for phenomena we can claim some
greater understanding. However, the presence of these
unmet assumptions can make a model very difficult to use
directly in either a descriptive or analytic capacity and we
often lack tools to establish the consequences of failure to
satisfy assumptions. 
In any case it is clearly desirable that the model should in
fact reflect differentiated access to information. Different
agents have different pools of knowledge (including access
to other people’s knowledge) as well as different objectives
for what they want to do with that knowledge.
Second, in the model proposed by Thoyer et al. the game
moves on to the next round by players refusing to come to
a compromise. The players decisions are weighted by their
access probability, which should in theory allow more pow-
erful players to impose compromises simply by virtue of
their ability to reduce the access probability of other
player’s proposals. Nevertheless this basic mechanism for
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 advancing or ending the game demands unrealistically high
levels of empowerment distribution among all players. In
order to model Punjabi conflict arbitration one must con-
tend with the differences in status, authority and power
between potential participants. In addition to the disputants
one must include the arbiters and other related individuals
in the model. It may be that the formal disputants are rela-
tively equal (which is in fact often the case), however their
case impacts on a wider range of people than themselves
and those people will be allowed some influence in the pro-
ceedings.
Third, Thoyer et al. have modelled a particular real life
situation in which the French state has established certain
procedures for negotiating competing interests in semi-lim-
ited resources. They are concerned with creating tools for
understanding that particular arena more fully. Conse-
quently the model is not so much an attempt to simulate the
entire procedure of settling water access allocations but
rather to model the formal, state sponsored, part of that
process. One might also profitably include competing are-
nas or contexts in this case if, for example, some players
held additional meetings with influential people not for-
mally involved in the process of water negotiations.
 
1.1 Multi-agent modelling.
 
Multi-agent modelling systems is an attempt to construct
simulated entities who may have conflicting objectives.
They may have access to different resources and different
knowledge pools. Individual agents can be assigned differ-
ent status, authority and power definitions at the outset of
the simulation and they can be given access to the tools
required to modify those positions. While this is a different
kind of analysis than the game-theory bargaining model of
Thoyer et al. much multi-agent modelling does not define
context or environment in the same complexity as agents.
The context is embedded within the agents (albeit different
aspects of the context may be embedded), however, I seek
to model contexts which may be as complex as agents. To
this end it is useful to follow the more radical MA systems
modellers who construct all variables as agents. That is to
say that the environment, or context, is itself made up of an
agent or agents which interact with each other as well as
other agents. Most agent modelling is based on the notion
of doing a materialist model, including the environment.
But there is only one of each. Structures and processes are
supposed to be emergent behaviour of these systems.
Where knowledge is a part of the system, each agent has
their own knowledge. The materialist model presumes a
common material set of ‘things’ which individual agents
may interpret differently, either by paying attention to spe-
cific details over others, or based on knowledge which is
not itself a part of the material context (but may instead be
rules that were induced over previous encounters).
Edmonds [2001] says there are multiple goals of multi-
agent based simulations (MABS). MABS may serve as
entertainment, art or illustration, in which case real life
complexity may be unnecessary. They may also serve as
tools for communication or science. If models and simula-
tions are to serve as tools for communication, it may also
prove necessary to reduce the complexity to the extent that
the model is not a viable representation of the phenomenon
(but which nonetheless serves to communicate certain
aspects of the phenomenon). If the purpose of the tool is to
clarify aspects of observed behaviour then, again, it is prob-
ably desirable to reduce many of the variables to simple
aggregates of expected entities. Since the interest of anthro-
pologists is by and large, people over environment (even
when they call themselves environmental anthropologists
the primary interest often remains people) it is understand-
able that social models have placed their energies in creat-
ing more intelligent active agents representing people,
rather than more complex agents representing environmen-
tal or contextual variables. One promising option currently
being pursued by Fischer [personal communication] is to
design simulation software which outputs XML streams of
data which may be aggregated or disaggregated depending
on the specific research issues.
For my purposes, an increased level of contextual com-
plexity has become unavoidable. Active agents represent-
ing people, should have the capacity to respond to emergent
contextual structures but those structures must be plural and
simultaneous. The model assumes the presence of compet-
ing sets of values and strategies as part of the context.
 
2. Modelling Context/Environment
 
There are numerous ways to model the context or environ-
ment. The differences emerge from the research questions.
It may be necessary to construct a reductionist model of
social context to address some specific issues and this may
aid in understanding more complex situations. Necessarily,
simpler models of context are unavoidable during the
developmental stage of a project. Simpler models become
more complex as understanding increases. Crudely speak-
ing, there are four choices of how to construct the context/
environment in a model:
 
1. single static structure (a ﬁxed set of rules throughout 
the duration of the model)
2. single evolving structure (a ﬁxed set of rules at the out-
set but which can change through the duration of the 
model)
3. multiple (competing) static structures (more than one 
set of ﬁxed rules throughout the duration of the model)
4. multiple (competing) evolving structures (more than 
one set of ﬁxed rules at the outset all of which can 
change throughout the duration of the model)
5. combinations of the above
 
Clearly the production of a single structure must precede
the production of multiple structures and this should gen-
erate certain insights by itself. The issues with which I am
concerned however, require something beyond either of the
first two options. I do not necessarily require multiple
evolving structures, though that should prove more impor-
tant as I expand my research questions to address the
changes that have occurred in Punjabi conflict resolution
over the past 50-60 years.
 
2.1 Complex agents interacting with complex 
contexts.
 
The basic assumptions which underlie the design of the
models proposed in this paper are as follows: 
 
1. there are socially constructed contexts which offer 
agents contradictory sets of values and strategies
 2. agents manipulate contextual strategies available 
based on their access to knowledge and their objective 
in the given instance
3. no two individuals have exactly the same access to 
knowledge nor are their objectives identical
4. ‘interested’ agents may not formally be a part of the 
dispute resolution process at all, yet they may be criti-
cal to explanations of predictions of the outcomes.
 
Different modelling strategies touch on some of these
assumptions/requirements but they do not address them all.
In part, the model should reflect an ‘unjust’ version of ‘jus-
tice’. Partiality of arbiters should be built in to the process.
Arbiters at all levels are interested agents who have their
own objectives which may or may not be compatible with
the objectives of disputants or indeed of some normative
expectations of the arbiter’s role. This design accepts that
some individuals may force compromise more easily than
others but that acceptance of compromise does not mean
compliance with that compromise. A simulation based on
the model would not therefore ‘end’ when a compromise
had been agreed. It would rather pursue the dispute to iden-
tify ways in which agents might circumvent agreements. In
the event that agreements are not respected then the model
and subsequent simulation should provide clues as to the
aspectsof conflict resolution agreements most vulnerable to
‘violation’.
 
3. Complex contexts
 
Legal pluralism has long been a feature of South Asian
society. The formal legal system of Pakistan came out of
the Islamic legal tradition
 
1
 
 (as practised in South Asia
under the Moghuls) and the British legal tradition
 
2
 
 (as
practised in the colonies). Since independence Pakistan has
attempted to rid itself of customary law, in so far as the for-
mal courts are concerned. The state's attempts at judicial
reform
 
3
 
 of the legal tradition notwithstanding, Pakistani
courts remain confusing and intimidating. The state has
implemented 
 
shari'at
 
 to govern domestic law. 
 
Shari’at
 
,
which began as a pragmatic attempt to cross cut indigenous
loyalties both in Arabia and the peripheries of the Islamic
world, today may be seen as a viable modernist legal code.
The Pakistani state’s adoption of the shari'at and British
legal systems has left little room for customary law in the
formal court system of Pakistan today. Effectively the only
decisions that may be based on custom are those of the
arbitration councils in the rural areas. Decisions based on
customary law become problematic in urban situations
where populations have come from a dozen or more differ-
ent sub-cultures, each with its own customary law. The lack
of uniformity between customary laws of different regions
(even within one province) has served to undermine these
traditional judicial systems in areas of intensive migration.
Nevertheless, traditional justice in the villages remains
common.
Traditional conflict resolution systems resemble legal
systems described by Gluckman [1957] in Barotse land.
Presumptions of judicial impartiality are noticeably absent
in both cases. Adjudicators take into account facts that are
not presented in formal hearings. The inclusion of individ-
uals not directly related to the case is perceived to render the
proceedings more ‘just’. Elsewhere I argue that the goal of
traditional arbitration in Punjab is more accurately
described as conflict deferment than conflict resolution
[Lyon 2001]. That is, people intervene when conflicts
threaten community relations and that intercession is
geared towards eliminating threats to that harmony rather
than achieving individual redressal of wrongs.
The legal tradition of Pakistan since independence is an
attempt to create a system based on precedent which may
act as guide in the judicial process. It has formal pretensions
to neutrality which are not always achievable but are at least
present. Decisions in Punjabi arbitration have a very differ-
ent goal that is similar with the origins of the shari'at in Ara-
bia and its application during the expansion of Islam but
incompatible with what shari'at has become. Its goal is to
facilitate a particular set of normative behaviours within the
community by preventing excessive disruption to groups
and it may achieve this goal through partiality and pragma-
tism without fear of setting future precedent. 
 
4. Modelling/simulating a real life 
conflict
 
The following case study illustrates many of the complex-
ities of contexts and agents. It involves a child custody case
which was confusing to the participants as well as unin-
volved observers. In Islam children are considered to
belong to their father's family and religion. In cases of
death or divorce fathers are deemed in all cases to be the
guardian of their children, however, young children may
remain in the care of the mother. The age at which children
may be separated from their mother differs by sect from
two-seven years and by custom often older (mid teens).
The person caring for the child must be 'sane, trustworthy
and of good morals' [Pearl 1988: 92]. If either parent is
determined to be morally unfit to care for the children then
they may lose guardianship rights. This may result in chil-
dren being left with other paternal relatives. The following
case demonstrates the way that individuals in real life (and
agents in simulations) can invoke multiple social value sets
for contradictory purposes. A model of this case require
that agents be capable of deception and have access to mul-
tiple shifting value sets. As one value set fails to deliver the
desired result then the agent should have a mechanism for
shifting to another. 
 
1.  Islamic law was introduced in South Asia in the early 8th
century and enjoyed varying degrees of application/enforcement
[Pearl 1987: 20-21, Schacht and Bosworth 1979]. Islamic law was
an attempt to replace tribal loyalties and affiliations with Islamic
community loyalties and affiliations [Gilmartin 1988: 43-44]. In
the early part of the Islamic era adjudication was to some extent an
 
ad hoc
 
 affair trying to cope with problems as they arose among the
newly formed Muslim community [Pearl 1987, Schacht and
Bosworth 1979]. 
 
2.  The British gave statutory recognition to custom in the Punjab
Laws Act (1872). British administrators felt it preferable to root
their legal presence in indigenous kin based rules rather than
religiously based rules.
3.  See Pearl [1987] for a more complete discussion of successive
Pakistani governments’ attempts to dismantle traditional law and
impose Islamic law. 
 4.1 Child custody case
 
Abdul’s wife died leaving behind a two year old
daughter. Following local Islamic Barelvi funerary
custom, Abdul and his relatives were in a state of
semi-public mourning for 40 days following the
woman’s death. During this time Abdul left his two
year old daughter in the care of his deceased wife’s
parents in the nearby city of Taxila. Upon comple-
tion of the 40 days mourning period he sent word
that he was ready to take his daughter back. His par-
ents-in-law refused him access to the child. Abdul
first asked his elder male relatives to intercede on his
behalf but this was unsuccessful. He and his father
then turned to one of the landlords in their village.
The selection of landlord was based on previous
familial connections with the landlord’s father. The
landlord, Malik Nawab, listened to their version of
events and then requested that a member of the
deceased wife’s family come to the village to pro-
vide their version. The brother of the woman came to
the village and accused Abdul of being a bad hus-
band, a drug user and an alcohol drinker. Malik
Nawab was not prepared to comment on Abdul’s
qualities as a husband but categorically rejected the
suggestion that Abdul was either a drug user or an
alcohol drinker. Malik Nawab then decided that the
case needed an arbiter of more experience and influ-
ence and so referred the case to his maternal uncle,
Malik Hafiz, who was a retired police officer and
well connected landlord in the region. Malik Hafiz
then invited several respected sharecroppers of both
himself and Malik Nawab to form a 
 
jirga
 
 (customary
dispute resolution council). The membership of the
jirga was accepted by both sides of the dispute. After
much travelling back and forth between the village
and Taxila, they announced that the disputants had
reached an agreement. The grandparents would
return the little girl and Abdul would return the
dowry. Abdul returned part of the dowry and
demanded his daughter before returning the rest. The
grandparents refused to return the little girl until all
the dowry had been returned. Abdul and his family
then decided to take the matter to the state courts of
Pakistan in the hopes that if the court found in their
favour the grandparents would have no choice but to
comply with a state court order.
This case could be seen as an outright failure of arbitration
however it did provide a 'cooling off' period for the father
and his family. In the initial stages of that case the potential
for violence was high in spite of the fact that neither side had
a history of violence. The issue was extremely serious and
potentially threatening to the local community. From the
point of view of Abdul’s village his choice to pursue the
matter in the state courts was less disruptive than had he
attempted to kidnap the child or resort to physical violence.
Arbitration eased tensions but did not eliminate them. This
case was locally seen as a failure to achieve a just result. If
recovery of the little girl had truly been the goal of the arbi-
ters, however, they might have accomplished it. 
A special relationship exists between police and local
elites in Pakistan. In rural areas police are acutely aware of
the position that local elites hold. In the area police present
themselves to local landlords to declare their intention of
arresting someone in the village. The landlord either tells
them he has no problem with the individual in question
being arrested or he would prefer the police let him handle
the matter himself. The police are aware that prisons and
jails are bad places to put delinquents. Young men who have
too much time on their hands may learn lifelong patterns of
criminality in prison. If a landlord decides to take an interest
in someone, he can effectively control their behaviour by
providing them work. If a landlord tells the police not to
arrest someone then generally what he is saying is that he
himself will provide the man with an activity which pre-
vents him from wrongdoing and will assume the role of
punisher if the need arises. The police have also been used
in the area to enforce illegal landlord interests (such as the
repossession of land redistributed under Ayub Khan and
Zulfikar Bhutto).
Given that the landlords in the area and the police have
such an intimate relationship Malik Hafiz might have asked
the police to help enforce his decision. The deceased
mother's parents had no evidence that Abdul was an unfit
father. Even if they had shari'at would still have proscribed
that the daughter be placed with someone in Abdul's family,
not her maternal family. Had Malik Hafiz opted for this
action then the level of negotiation would have been
between Malik Hafiz and Abdul’s parents-in-law's patrons.
Malik Hafiz would have had to persuade the patrons of the
grandparents that his actions were just and merited police
intervention. To my knowledge Malik Hafiz never consid-
ered turning to the police or anyone above the level of
Abdul and his parents-in-law, in any event he did not do so
if he did consider it. The implication is clear-- their priority
was not the fate of the child nor Abdul. They became
involved because one of their clients was in a position in
which his izzat
 
4
 
 was being threatened. Had the situation
turned violent the police would have become involved and
Abdul might have found himself in serious trouble. The
goal of the arbiters was the resumption of normative (i.e.
non-disruptive) behaviour on the part of Abdul and his clos-
est relatives.
 
4.2 Agents and interactions
 
In order to model this case one needs to define the agents as
indicated in Table 0-1 below. Clearly there are a great many
more agents which might be usefully disaggregated from
the above set, however, this set of agents provides a critical
set of agents for explanatory and predictive models. 
Disputant Agents (DA), Arbiter Agents (AA) and Inter-
ested Agents (IA) should conform to the Read and Fischer
[2000] type ‘E’ agents:
agents respond to emergent structures and modify/
change aspects of an underlying conceptual system
that influences the progress of the response and
future initial responses.
These are active agents in that they choose courses of
action and select which agents are necessary to bring about
 
4.  Loosely translated this may be understood as honour. This is
different from Mediterranean honour, however, (e.g. Pitt-Rivers
1965; Davis 1977; Stewart 1994). An individual’s 
 
izzat
 
 as the
measure of their ability to control themselves, their family, and
other people.
 desired results. They seek to engage the resources of other
agents on their own behalf. They may contradict ‘true’ state-
ments if that serves the needs of their specific goals. They
may equally modify their course of action if it appears that
they will not achieve desirable results.
Context Agents (CA) are an attempt to render the under-
lying conceptual systems as agents. They are, in effect,
agents whose parameters include a reified set of values,
approved strategies, neutral strategies and disapproved
strategies. Parameters of different CA’s need not be com-
patible with each other. Like the more conventional DA, AA
and IA, these special agents should be capable of modifica-
tion as a result of interactions, yet these are passive modi-
fications which are the result of interaction, not the result of
goal oriented decision making.
One important difference between DA, AA, IA on the one
hand, and CA on the other, is that CA do not ‘violate’ their
own set of values or rules and they are not capable of decep-
tion. They are passive agents which other agents tap into in
order to deal with particular situations. While they can be
modified, they cannot lie. All parameters of CA are ‘true’
(even though they may also appear to include contradic-
tions). The active agents, contrarily, are capable of decep-
tion. They interact with the CA’s but where the CA appears
to be inadequate to resolve issues to the agent’s satisfaction,
the agent may choose to try and ‘break’ the rules or lie about
his or her situation. Non-CA agents can, therefore, misrep-
resent their own parameters in ways that CA cannot
(remember that CA do not ‘represent’ themselves but are
rather utilised by other agents for their purposes).
At the level of interaction between agents, the model con-
forms to the Read and Fischer [2000] type ‘e’ modality of
interaction:
models in which the syntactic structure is not fixed
but may change in accordance with conditions that
arise in the external-material and/or internal-ide-
ational domains; e.g., change in the form of social
structure or of a kinship terminology (cf. Read
1987).
From the outset of the model competing syntactic struc-
tures are formally defined as part of the system. At the start
of the model, the CA represent a normative set of competing
syntactic structures which other agents will employ to
achieve contradictory goals. As the model progresses, not
only do agents selectively employ the competing syntactic
structures but also the syntactic structures themselves
become open to modification as a result of agent interaction.
The starting point of CA includes certain values and strat-
egies which are necessarily resistant to some kinds of mod-
ification, however, they should reflect real human contexts
and be open to some kinds of change as the interaction with
different agents progresses.
Finally, agents do not all have equal access to each other.
Thus, while one would expect most Punjabis to have access
to the Kinship resolution CA this implies that the agent has
a kinship group available within a reasonable distance.
There are agents who do not have access to such strategies
because they lack the appropriate kin networks within the
geographical area. Similarly, an agent must have access to a
landlord in order to employ the Landlord intervention CA.
Within the set of agents who do have access to that partic-
ular CA, there should be differential access to the full range
of values and strategies. Thus in the case study I have pro-
vided, Malik Nawab did not feel he had complete enough
access to the full range of strategies necessary to resolve the
issue, and so turned to another landlord/agent who he
believed had greater access to the range of strategies. Agents
know of the existence of each other but they are not privy to
a wide enough range of the parameters or contents of each
other to utilise all other agents equally well. The model is
predicated on an assumption of distributed and unequal
access to knowledge, networks and abilities.
 
5. Multi-agent, multi-strategy, multi-
value set modelling.
 
Environment may be modelled as one or more agents. The
value sets that agents draw on may seem incompatible and
contradictory, nevertheless, in real life situations they co-
exist. Perhaps they co-exist in real life so readily because
they are contradictory. Information theory would support
this proposition. Information theory recognises the impor-
tance of message variability. If the message variability is
too low then while predictability is high, the message may
only deal with a narrow range of circumstances. Con-
versely, if message variability is too high, then predictabil-
ity is low and no situation can be dealt with well. In an
uncertain world it is necessary to have some degree of both
message variability together with some limits on that vari-
ability. This context suggests that one can either have a very
elaborate single value system that will perform well in most
circumstances, or a lot of less elaborate value systems, each
of which applies well to some version of the world. It may
also in some cases be necessary to carry multiple sets
simultaneously in order to deal with multiple parties. 
In Pakistan, where there is little bureaucratic or state sta-
bility, contradictory value sets prove extremely useful as
weapons of resistance against the arbitrariness of shifting
governments and bureaucrats. Likewise, the strategies at the
individuals’ disposal offer plural possibilities which can be
accessed for different reasons. Finally, the intervention or
 
Table 0-1. 
 
Agents
 
Disputant Agents (DA) Arbiter Agents (AA) Interested Agents (IA)
 
Context Agents (CA)
 
Abdul Abdul’s Father Abdul’s extended patrilin-
eage
 
Kinship resolution
 
Abdul’s parents-in-law Malik Nawab Abdul’s parents-in-law’s 
Taxila patrons
 
Landlord intervention
 
Abdul’s brother-in-law Malik Haﬁz Police
 
Jirga hearings/negotiations
 
Abdul’s father Individual Sharecroppers Villagers
 
State Court system
 influence of uninvolved agents is tremendously significant
in the Pakistani Punjab. In the case study it became quite
clear through the course of the negotiations that the arbiters
had a very clear agenda which had very little to do with the
fate of the child or either disputing party. Their objective
involved a value set which placed the collective good as a
higher priority than individual needs. I did not have suffi-
cient space to discuss other uninvolved individuals, how-
ever, there were others who were similarly ‘interested’ and
had an impact on the proceedings. 
The purpose of modelling and simulation is to render
complex systems into representations which can be ana-
lysed. This may, and often does, involve simplification and
generalisation, however, this should be done when there is
a valid analytical need to do so. In the case of Punjabi con-
flict resolution not only is there not a valid analytical need
to reduce the complexity of the context but there are very
valid analytical reasons not to do so.
In the case of Punjabi conflict resolution it is clear that
models should reflect not only the responsiveness of agents
to emergent syntactic structures, but also to competing
extant syntactic structures. The model assumes a real life
scenario in which there are a plurality of values and strate-
gies available to agents. It also assumes that those values
and strategies can be modified to some extent and that when
that occurs, the agents must modify their interaction as well
as their own parameters.
The purpose of this paper is not to suggest that other types
of models have no value. Different models serve different
purposes. The research questions which I have posed
require a particular type of model which can cope with com-
peting contextual structures in more agent like ways. To be
sure, they constitute a special type of agent but, like agents
they must have individualised parameters which inform
interactions between other agents and which may have the
capacity for modification as a result of interaction. Other
ways of modelling context do not serve my purposes for
these research questions, yet they can and do help us deal
with other kinds of research questions.
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